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Abstract
Ever since the classical works of Smith and Veblen, economists have recognized
that individuals care about their relative positions and status in addition to their
own consumption. This paper addresses a new framework of choice experiments in
order to specify the shape of utility function with preference externalities. Theoreti-
cal studies on social preference, which are conducted without estimating or calibrat-
ing important parameters of social preference and put forward various propositions
in accordance with the parameters assumed, can refer to the parameters estimated
in this paper. Our ¯ndings complement those of happiness studies which support
the view of social preference. We show that preference externality is, on average,
characterized by jealousy among Japanese respondents, and also that heterogeneity
in social preference parameters is driven by di®erences in income levels, age, and
gender.
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1 Introduction
In the literature of behavioral economics, important parameters have been estimated via
experiments, and policy implications derived from theoretical studies addressing these
parameters have shown a richness and more practical adaptation. Thus far, consider-
able progress has been made in ¯elds such as environmental economics, health economics,
and transportation economics. In this paper, we apply a choice experiment method in a
survey experiment to the economics of social preference. Although the social preference
e®ect has been recognized since the classical works of Adam Smith and Thorstein Veblen
and despite the fact that there are a number of happiness studies in the literature that
support the view of social preference, there is as yet no direct information on the shape of
utility function with social preference. This paper bridges the gap between the theoreti-
cal and empirical studies on social preference by estimating the signs and magnitudes of
preference parameters using conditional and mixed logit models. The techniques of choice
experiments are, as far as we are aware, new to the literature of social preference. Theo-
retical studies with preference externality have provided di®erent types of implications in
accordance with di®erences in assumed parameters. However, we believe that such stud-
ies will be able to provide more practical policy implications in the future by addressing
estimated parameters in choice experiments of the kind we provide in this paper.
Regarding the existence of social preferences, many studies on happiness regressions
support the view in terms of jealousy e®ects. These studies include Clark and Oswald
[1996], Alesina, Di Tella, and MacCulloch [2004], Luttmer [2005], Ferrer-i Carbonell [2005],
and Clark, Kristensen, and Westergard-Nielsen [2009b].1 On the other hand, some ex-
perimental studies support the view of social preference in the form of egalitarianism
1Senik [2004] showed that her proxies of reference wage a®ect happiness positively in a Russian data
set. She argued this happened because the reference wage measures worked as signal devices rather than
social comparison ones. In another study of happiness regressions that provided \admiration" results,
Clark, Kristensen, and Westergard-Nielsen [2009a] argued that a social preference as a form of admiration
resulted since they focused on comparison among neighbors, in which case reference income served as a
proxy of social capital. See Frey and Stutzer [2001] and Frey and Stutzer [2002] for reviews of happiness
studies in the literature. Also see Clark, Frijters, and Shields [2008] for an excellent review of happiness
studies on social preference.
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(Fehr, Bernhard, and Rockenbach [2008]; Bartling, Fehr, Marechal, and Schunk [2009]).2
Since it is possible that with egalitarianism people favor improvements in the economic
situation of others, egalitarianism can be related to \admiration". Moreover, recent
developments in neuroscience have clari¯ed the brain mechanism of social preferences
(Fliessbach, Weber, Trautner, Dohmen, Sunde, Elger, and Falk [2007]; Fehr and Camerer
[2007]). Hence, in general, evidence from many research ¯elds supports the notion of so-
cial preferences. However, as previous studies have provided mixed results about the sign
and magnitude of social preference e®ects, here we further investigate the issue using the
strategy of choice experiments.
In a policy context of theoretical economics analyses, the existence of social prefer-
ence has consequences on optimal tax decisions Oswald [1983]. Since social preference
functions as an externality in competitive markets, welfare maximization in a society
can be attained only with the knowledge of the direction and intensity of the e®ects
(Corneo and Jeanne [1997]; Corneo and Jeanne [2001]). Also, it has been considered
that social preference a®ects asset pricings in macro economies (Abel [1990]; Gali [1994];
Bakshi and Chen [1996]). However, without knowledge of the true parameters, we can-
not determine whether the e®ects of social preference are large enough to have conse-
quential e®ects on macroeconomic asset pricings. By introducing the choice experiments
framework to the literature of social preference, we can obtain evidence which is directly
applicable to theoretical studies of social preference.3 Moreover, by applying our strat-
2Interestingly, experiments on non-human animals, namely, chimpanzees, showed that they are not en-
dowed with social preferences. See, for example, Silk and et al. [2005], Jensen, Hare, Call, and Tomasello
[2006], and Jensen and Tomasello [2007].
3The reason why the literature of happiness studies cannot provide direct information on utility
function is that dependent variables for the regressions of subjective well-being (SWB) are constructed
from surveys which typically ask respondents to select levels of job or life satisfaction from a list of
numbers. The selected numbers are then considered to be proxies of the levels of \utility". However, there
has been some debate about interpretations of the nature of SWB, since researchers have not been sure
whether it represents cardinal or ordinal utility (van Praag [1991]; Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters [2004]).
Also, SWB measures of respondents will be in°uenced by many aspects of their life including individual
characteristics and mood on the day of the survey Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, and Stone
[2006]. On the other hand, utility in a technical sense is considered to be dependent just upon consumption
(and social status). This ambiguity about the coverage of SWB measures means that researchers cannot
specify the shape of \utility function" from the SWB data, which encompasses measurement errors of
utility.
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egy of choice experiments, we can overcome a problematic issue common to happiness
studies of social preference: construction of the proxies of social preference in happiness
regressions is di±cult because people's determinations of reference groups are endogenous
(de la Garza, Mastrobuoni, Sannabe, and Yamada [2009]). With our choice experiments,
the endogeneity problem can be mitigated since the socio-economic situations and refer-
ence points are exogenously given.
In this paper, similar to Viscusi, Huber, and Bell [2008], we estimate important pa-
rameters associated with consumer preferences by using a random utility model, and con-
ditional ¯xed-e®ects logit and mixed logit models. The data for our study was collected
using a survey methodology rather than using an experimental structure.4 The cohort
pro¯le of our study sample mirrored the Japanese census statistics, and for this sample
we estimated the parameters in utility function which regulate preference externalities. A
major di®erence between Viscusi et al. [2008] and our paper is that Viscusi et al. [2008]
used a structural setting to infer parameters from estimates in conditional logit models
while we use a reduced-form formulation and impose normalizing assumptions on scale
parameters to specify preference parameters from our estimates. In this sense, our method
may be more akin to that of Ida and Goto [2009] in which time and risk preference param-
eters are estimated using a reduced-form setting. Whereas Ida and Goto [2009] presume
that the scale parameters are equal to one, in this paper, we make preferred normalizing
assumptions on them and specify the shape of utility function with social preference.5
The major ¯ndings presented in this paper can be summarized as follows. First, from
the conditional logit model, preference externality is characterized by jealousy rather than
4Experimental studies on game theory and social preference include Charness and Rabin [2002].
5See Train [2003] for the interpretations of scale parameters in conditional logit models. We argue that
our strategy is more appropriate than that in Ida and Goto [2009] where the full sample is divided into sub-
groups and preference parameters are estimated separately in each sub-group. With their methodology,
if scale parameters, which are unknown to researchers, are di®erent across sub-groups, we cannot directly
compare estimates coming from the di®erent sub-groups. With our data set, although not shown in
this paper, it was con¯rmed, with heteroscedastic logit models, that there are signi¯cant di®erences
in the scale parameters across sub-groups of di®erent individual characteristics. The structural setting
in Viscusi et al. [2008] is much superior regarding this point since normalizing assumptions on scale
parameters are not required in their framework.
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admiration among Japanese respondents. Second, we obtain that the welfare loss in a
competitive symmetric equilibrium caused by the preference externality is around 2.6 per-
cent, compared to the social optimum. We argue that the intensity of market ine±ciency
resulting from social preference is comparable to that resulting from in°ation and price
rigidity. Thirdly, we consider the heterogeneity of preference parameters. Using a mixed
logit model, we obtain that 64.4 percent of our study sample have negative preference
externality (jealousy), and that the remaining 35.6 percent have positive preference ex-
ternality (admiration). We also consider preference parameter heterogeneity caused by
demographic di®erences. We show that heterogeneity in social preference parameters is
driven by di®erences in income levels, age, and gender.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of our
data set and introduces the choice task in which respondents make socio-economic situa-
tion choices. We also provide evidence of the existence of social preference among respon-
dents from happiness regressions. Section 3 describes the features of the random utility
model and provides baseline preference parameters from the conditional logit model. In
section 4, we consider the heterogeneity of preference parameters across individuals by
using the mixed logit model, and by using the conditional logit model with dummy in-
teractions. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks and the Appendices present the
results of rationality tests and scope tests.
2 Data
2.1 Structure of dataset
Our data set is taken from an original Web-based survey conducted in March 2009. A
Japanese consumer monitoring company, whose total number of registered subjects is
around 990,000, conducted the survey. Japanese subjects aged between 18 and 69 were
chosen at random from the population such that the cohort pro¯le of our study sample
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mirrored the Japanese census statistics. The company distributed the survey to 2,859
monitors and 1,043 of them completed the survey. The average investigation time to
¯nish the survey was 18 minutes 30 seconds. Each respondent who completed the survey
was paid about 800 yen (about 8 US dollars). Because each respondent was asked to
respond to eight situation choice tasks repeatedly, the number of observations from our
choice experiment is 8,344 at maximum. We removed observations if they did not provide
su±cient information.6
Descriptive statistics of the entire sample are shown in Table 1. Women account for
around 48 percent of the entire sample. Mean age of the respondents is 44.9 years and
66 percent of the entire sample is married. Regarding educational attainment, 3 percent
of the sample completed middle school only, 33 percent completed high school, and 39
percent pursued more advanced studies. The remaining 25 percent of the sample holds
other degrees including those from technical and 2-year college programs. We do not see
a big demographic di®erence between men and women except in the case of college and
post doctoral attainments.
2.2 Choice tasks
In the survey, each subject considered socio-economic situation choice tasks. Before the
respondents completed the repeated choice tasks, they answered two questions related to
social comparison. The ¯rst question concerned self-assessment on attitude toward social
comparison in the form of pecuniary rat races. The question was phrased as \Are you
conscious about the levels of others' consumption and savings?". The respondent was
asked to mark down the level of jealousy from 5 response options, where 1 corresponded
to \not jealous at all" and 5 denoted \very jealous". The second question concerned
the respondent's de¯nition of their reference group. They were asked to choose one
category, from those applicable to them, as their reference group among (i) relatives,
6Hence, the e®ective response rate was 30.0 percent for our study. The average response rate for
surveys of this kind conducted by the company is reportedly around 35 percent.
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(ii) neighbors, (iii) friends, (iv) friends from school, (v) colleagues, and (vi) others. Out
of the entire sample, only 43 respondents (4.1 percent) stated that they do not have a
reference group and do not compare themselves with others. After answering these two
questions, the respondents were considered ready for the following situation choice tasks
of social comparison.
Our research strategy was to elicit respondents' preference toward social comparison
through choice experiments (stated preference method). Among some of the previous
theoretical studies on preference externalities, such as Futagami and Shibata [1998], it
was assumed that people care about relative amount of wealth, that is, a stock variable.
However, in our survey, in order to avoid the complexities involved in inter-temporal eco-
nomic decision making, we concentrate on the intra-temporal aspect of social comparison.
That is, we consider the allocation of consumption and saving out of certain amount of
income for a given period, but do not consider ¯nancial or real stock as a device of social
comparison.7 Note that we did not specify a time span because doing so may remove
reality from the choice task for some subjects. Instead, given the levels of attributes, the
respondents could adjust the time span for consumption and saving in accordance with
their real lives. One more crucial matter in the choice experiment is how to de¯ne an
appropriate reference person in the socio-economic choice experiment; the possibilities,
including the average person in society, colleagues, persons de¯ned by the Leyden school
de¯nition, family, neighbors, and so forth, are endless. Nevertheless, our preferred speci¯-
cation here is that the reference point is given by \some representative person in society",
a de¯nition which is akin to that used in previous theoretical studies. The situation choice
tasks employed in this study are as follows.
Question: Imagine that for a given period of time you can make consump-
tion and savings of certain amounts. In the following ¯gures, pairs of your
consumption and saving as well as those of \some representative person in so-
7Using the perpetual inventory method, we may be able to infer a steady state level of wealth in a
dynamic setting from our intra-temporal decision problem.
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ciety" are presented. Imagine that each set on your consumption-saving pro¯le
and the other's consumption-saving pro¯le regulates society's socio-economic
situations. Which of situation 1 and 2 do you prefer?
Situation 1 Situation 2
Other's consumption Other's consumption
3 million yen 3 million yen
Other's saving Other's saving
3 million yen 2 million yen
Your consumption Your consumption
1 million yen 3 million yen
Your saving Your saving
4 million yen 1 million yen
Ans. (1) Situaion 1 (2) Situation 2 (3) don't know, cannot choose
Hence, in this choice experiment we assume that there are four attributes for an alter-
native. Respondents receive information on these four dimensions of the choices: own
consumption, own saving, other's consumption, and other's saving. Respondents repeat
eight situation choices, which are de¯ned along these four dimensions. So, in the case
of the example given above, if a subject is concerned only with his own consumption-
saving levels and if he is inclined to saving, he will choose Situation 1. However, if the
subject feels jealous of the other's consumption and/or saving, he may choose Situation
2 at the expense of his own economic activity in order to turn away from the other's
higher level of saving in Situation 1. If he has an altruistic preference (admiration), he
may choose Situation 1 even when he wants to make consumption more in Situation 2.
After some pretests, we determined the levels of these attributes and the survey included
the following situation variations { JPY 1 million, JPY 2 million, JPY 3 million, or JPY
4 million for each dimension. The choice sets were selected via orthogonal design and
16 situation choices out of a total of 256 potential variations were used in the survey.8
8We used SPSS ver 15.0 for orthogonal design and STATA ver 10.1 for the rest of the empirical
analyses, together with Hole's STATA modules for mixed logit model estimation (Hole [2007]).
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Similarly to Viscusi et al. [2008], the choice design was paired so as to balance the utility
of each alternative (Huber and Zwerina [1996]). Finally, we avoided dominant options or
easy choices. With all these devices, we could e±ciently obtain parameter estimates. We
removed observations in which the no-choice option (3) was selected in the choice tasks
from our study sample, leaving us with 6,872 observations out of the total 8,344 (82.3
percent).
2.3 Testing Social Preference with Happiness Regressions
While our main focus is on choice experiments for measuring the shape of utility function,
we can investigate if our study sample has social preference in general by performing
happiness regressions. The survey asked each respondent to provide information on his
own level of pecuniary satisfaction in life by selecting from 5 response options, where 1
corresponded to \least satis¯ed" and 5 denoted \most satis¯ed". The survey also asked
that, from a list of 15 categories, workers mark down their own level of wage and subjective
perception of reference wage, where the reference group was de¯ned in the Leyden school
fashion.9 In the analysis that follows, we measure individual income as the mid-point in
each of the 13 intermediate categories, and use ad hoc values close to the minimum and
maximum wage levels for the two extremes. Thus, respondents who reported categories
1, 2, . . . , 15 as their annual income level, were assigned an annual income of 0; 0.5; .
. . ; 22.5 million yen, respectively. We also collected information about ¯nancial assets
using 12 response options. The assigned values for ¯nancial assets in the regressions are
determined as explained in Table 2. Alternative choices do not alter the main results.10
Figure 1 shows the averages of reported happiness and reference income category across
own income categories. As can be seen, those with a higher annual income tend to report a
higher level of happiness, while they expect a higher level of reference income. Therefore,
9The question concerning the reference wage was phrased as \What do you think the average annual
total wage is of those who are your age, gender, and educational attainment?"
10Table 2 shows the distribution of income and ¯nancial assets among subjects. We provided Category
16 for annual income and Category 13 for ¯nancial assets for those who do not want to provide such
information.
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it is plausible that richer people feel happier (Alesina et al. [2004]). In addition, richer
people will expect a higher reference income because the reference group in the survey is
de¯ned as a group with similar individual characteristics, which covers income level.
Since less satis¯ed people may tend to report a higher level of reference wage, there
might be endogeneity between pecuniary satisfaction in life and the level of reported ref-
erence wage. In order to control for this potential endogeneity, we use the information on
pecuniary jealousy which is described in section 3. In this paper, we take this jealousy
measure to re°ect pessimism among subjects, which can be used to control the bias for
pessimistic people (de la Garza et al. [2009]). Figure 2 illustrates the averages of jealousy
and reference income category across the level of satisfaction. As shown, those with a
higher level of satisfaction tend to report a lower level of pecuniary jealousy. On the
other hand, they also report a higher level of reference income. We need to move to
multivariate analysis in order to see how the proxy of reference income | the measure of
social comparison | a®ects satisfaction. The data set also allows us to control for indi-
vidual demographic characteristics, which include gender, region, occupation, educational
attainment, number of children, and marital status.11
Table 3 shows the results of baseline regressions where individual demographic char-
acteristics are not controlled. In the ¯rst column, we see that log of own income a®ects
pecuniary satisfaction positively and signi¯cantly. The sign of log of reference income,
however, is negative, which means that people tend to have not altruism but rivalry, al-
though this does not reach signi¯cance. In the second column where we add ¯nancial
assets into the set of independent variables, the e®ect of social comparison becomes sig-
ni¯cant at the 10 percent level. When we add our measure of jealousy in column (4), we
¯nd that jealousy a®ects satisfaction negatively.12 In column (6) where we add all the
baseline regressors, we ¯nd that all of them are estimated correctly and are signi¯cant
except for own income. In Table 4, we investigate the e®ects of introducing other indi-
11In the happiness regressions presented below, from the total of 1,043 observations, 177 were lost due
to insu±cient information on ¯nancial assets or annual income level, leaving us with 843.
12The e®ect is found to be robust across speci¯cations.
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vidual demographic characteristics as regressors so as to determine whether the results in
Table 3 are robust. The results show that, although in some speci¯cations signi¯cance is
not reached, our study sample has social preference as a form of rivalry, given that the
reference income terms a®ect satisfaction negatively.13 With this observation, we expect
that in the following choice experiments we will obtain negative externalities in utility
function.
3 Basic results from a random utility model
3.1 Random utility model
Here we describe our theoretical foundation of the concept of conjoint analysis. Individ-
uals derive utility from their own consumption of a homogenous good c and own saving
s. In addition, they may be a®ected by the levels of consumption C and saving S of
their representative person in society. Since each individual cannot choose the levels
of consumption and saving made by the representative person, the other's consumption
and saving are considered as regulating consumption externality and saving externality,
respectively. In this case, the utility function is generally given by
U = U(c; s; C; S); (1)
where U represents the utility function. From textbook assumptions, we suppose that
subjects value attributes c and s positively. On the other hand, the representative person's
consumption and saving can be valued positively or negatively. Hence, an increase in the
level of consumption/saving by the representative person in society may raise or lower the
level of the other's welfare. Following the literature, a negative externality is characterized
as jealousy, while a positive one is characterized as admiration. We address the following
13We would attribute non-signi¯cance in our regressions to the small number of samples.
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utility function in which each component is described by an exponential form as
U = c®s¯CÂSÃ; (2)
where ®, ¯, Â and Ã are parameters.14 We presume that ® and ¯ are positive. We do
not impose restrictions on Â and Ã a priori, because they are regulated by social norm. If
their signs are positive, then the social norm of social comparison will be of admiration;
if they are negative, society has a social norm of jealousy.
To analyze the conjoint decisions, we use a random utility model framework. Let i
denote alternative i, and n denote respondent n. Then, in order to bring the theoretical
framework to the data, we take the logarithms of both sides in Equation 2 to obtain
lnUni = ® ln cni + ¯ ln sni + Â lnCni + Ã lnSni: (3)
The above expression can be used for estimating parameters via a random utility model
together with an error term ²n. The probability pni that respondent n prefers alternative
i to alternative j is given by
pni = Prob
¡
® ln cni + ¯ ln sni + Â lnCni + Ã lnSni + ²ni
> ® ln cnj + ¯ ln snj + Â lnCnj + Ã lnSnj + ²nj
¢
; for all j 6= i: (4)
When ²n is distributed following independent and identical distribution of extreme value
type 1 (IIDEV1), we obtain a conditional logit model (McFadden [1974]). Logit models
estimate the parameters in Equation 4 using the maximized likelihood method with data
from choice experiments. Here, it should be remembered that estimated variables are
divided by the scale parameter ¾, which is unknown to researchers (Train [2003], p41).
Namely,
14It is also possible that we address the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) type utility function.
Implications obtained below remain unchanged.
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[e]ach of the coe±cients is scaled by 1=¾. The parameter ¾ is called the
scale parameter, because it scales the coe±cients to re°ect the variance of the
unobserved portion of utility. (Train [2003])
We cannot obtain the \true" magnitude of the parameters in Equation 3 without addi-
tional restriction, since the estimated version of Equation 3 then should be expressed as
lnUni =
®¤
¾
ln cni +
¯¤
¾
ln sni +
Â¤
¾
lnCni +
Ã¤
¾
lnSni + ²n; (5)
where the original parameters are obtained as ® = ®
¤
¾
, ¯ = ¯
¤
¾
, Â = Â
¤
¾
, and Ã = Ã
¤
¾
.
Quoting Train [2003] again,
for interpretation it is useful to recognize that these estimated parameters
are actually estimates of the original coe±cients [®, ¯, Â, and Ã] divided by
the scale parameter ¾. The coe±cients that are estimated indicate the e®ect
of each observed variable relative to the variance of the unobserved factors. A
larger variance in unobserved factors leads to smaller coe±cients, even if the
observed factors have the same e®ect on utility (i.e., higher ¾ means lower [®,
¯, Â, and Ã] even if [®¤, ¯¤, Â¤, and Ã¤ are] the same).
Previous studies, such as Ida and Goto [2009], tended to assume that ¾ = 1 so that
estimated variables are interpretable without knowledge of ¾.15 Such a normalization is
innocuous because Train [2003] showed that the overall scale of utility is irrelevant.16 In
this study, we impose another restriction on the scale parameter ¾ to obtain our preferred
\true" set of parameters.
15Ida and Goto [2009] called ¸ a scale parameter, which is de¯ned as ¸ = ¼p
6¾
. See, for this point,
Louviere, Hensher, and Swait [2000].
16If we wish to know the di®erence of variance between the sub-groups in the study sample, the
heteroscedastic logit model can be used. It is interesting to discuss the accuracy of decision mak-
ing in choice experiments through observing the heterogeneity of error variance among sub-groups
(de Palma, Myers, and Papageorgiou [1994]). For further analysis of the heterogeneity of the error term
in our research context, see our accompanying paper.
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3.2 Results from conditional logit model
In the conditional logit model, it is assumed that the IIA assumption holds: random
components of each alternative are not correlated. We also assume that the random
components within each subject are not correlated. Later, we proceed to the mixed logit
model where these assumptions are relaxed and the distributions of parameters across
subjects are allowed.
Results from the conditional logit model are shown in Table 5. In the left panel, we see
that both self consumption and self saving a®ect utility positively and signi¯cantly, as is
expected. On the other hand, the e®ects of other's consumption and saving are estimated
to be negative. These e®ects are signi¯cant at the 1 percent level. At this point, we can
provide two of our baseline results from the choice experiments as follows. First, the fact
that self consumption and self saving a®ect utility positively will validate our structure of
the survey because the results from the choice experiments conform to textbook economic
assumptions. Next, we can suggest that externalities in the utility function are regulated
as negatives. Hence, the dominating social norm of pecuniary comparison in the Japanese
economy will not be of admiration but of jealousy. This ¯nding is in line with our previous
results from happiness regressions.
As described above, estimates in Table 5 do not provide the \true" magnitude for the
parameter set because they are divided by unknown ¾. To obtain a clearer implication on
the shape of utility function, we impose our preferred normalizing assumption that the
utility function is homogenous of degree one with respect to own income, that is, the sum
of consumption and saving. From the speci¯cation in Equation 5, we obtain our preferred
\true" parameter set by dividing the estimates with 0:3766 + 2:0226 = 2:3992(= 1=¾).
Thus, our choice experiment speci¯es the shape of utility function which encompasses
negative externalities as
U = c0:157s0:843C¡0:045S¡0:182: (6)
Some further implications can be drawn from Equation 6. First, with respect to self
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allocation of resources, saving plays a more dominant role than consumption. The ratio
of elasticity of utility on self consumption to that on self saving is estimated to 0.186.
The same pattern can be found with respect to other's consumption and saving. This
inclination to saving may derive from the fact that the survey was conducted in the
midst of the recent ¯nancial recession. The severe market conditions might have induced
subjects to refrain from consumption behavior such that they increase saving in readiness
for uncertain future economic situations.
Second, we obtain that the welfare loss in a competitive symmetric equilibrium caused
by the estimated preference externality is around 2.6 percent, compared to the social op-
timum.17 While this loss of 2.6 percent compared to the optimum is that resulting from
a one-shot economic decision, we may be able to compare our ¯gure with the results from
dynamic models such as the monetary models of Lucas [2000] and the sticky price model
of Amano, Moran, Murchison, and Rennison [2009] if we refer to the steady state impli-
cations of these dynamic models. We argue that the intensity of market ine±ciency from
social preference is comparable to that from in°ation and price rigidity, and call for more
attention from macroeconomic studies along this line. Also, here we can refer to theoreti-
cal studies on consumption externality such as Dupor and Liu [2003], Liu and Turnovsky
[2005], Chen and Hsu [2007], Nakamoto [2009a], and Nakamoto [2009b]. From Equation
6,we obtain that the sign of the cross-derivative between self-consumption and other's con-
sumption is negative, indicating a running-away-from-the-Joneses e®ect. In other words,
individuals are anti-conformists who dislike being similar to others.18 19
The third implication is that the e®ect of self-budget will dominate that of the other's
budget. This point can be con¯rmed more clearly by considering a utility function which
17See Appendix 1 for the derivation.
18Yamada [2008] investigated a macroeconomic model with conspicuous consumption and showed that
if the social norm is anti-conformity, the development process of the economy is monotonic.
19We can con¯rm the concavity of the utility function in Equation 6. In the symmetric equilibrium,
the marginal utility of consumption and saving is positive and increasing in respective arguments. The
utility function has the characteristic of joint concavity with consumption and saving (i.e., @
2U
@C@C
@2U
@S@S >
@2U
@C@S ).This property can be viewed as helpful because the interior solution is guaranteed when the
maximization problem in the symmetric equilibrium is considered.
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depends on own income i and other's income I as
U = U(i; I): (7)
In the survey, the level of own income can be naturally obtained as the sum of self
consumption and self saving. From the right panel of Table 5 in which the result from
Equation 7 is illustrated, we see that the point estimate on self-income is much greater
than that of other's income. More importantly, from the 95 percent con¯dence intervals
of these two variables, we can con¯rm that the absolute value of the lower bound for
self-income is greater than that for other's income. Thus, we suggest that raising the
incomes of all by the same amount will increase the happiness of all. Put another way,
this ¯nding contradicts the famous Easterlin paradox (Easterlin [1974], Easterlin [1995])
and favors the money-buys-happiness hypothesis (Alesina et al. [2004]). The novelty of
our paper is that we derived the implication by estimating the shape of utility function
directly with the choice experiment, not from happiness regressions.20
The speci¯cation of Equation 7 is also useful for estimating CRRA utility function as
appeared in Liu and Turnovsky [2005]. We address a CRRA type utility function of the
form:
U =
1
1¡ ° (iI
·)1¡°:
By applying estimates in Table 5, the utility function is speci¯ed as
U =
1
1¡ 0:2739(iI
¡0:3160)1¡0:2739;
where the scale parameter is obtained as 1=¾ = 1=(1¡ 0:2739).
20In addition to happiness studies with micro data, some studies have provided evidence of \money
buys happiness". Examples include Alesina et al. [2004] and de la Garza et al. [2009]. However, the
seminal paper in the literature, Clark and Oswald [1996], showed otherwise. See Clark et al. [2008] for
an excellent review.
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4 Heterogeneity of preference parameters across in-
dividual characteristics
4.1 Results from mixed logit model
Table 6 shows the results from a mixed logit model in which distributions of parameters
are allowed. In other words, in the mixed logit model, we can observe heterogeneity of
preference among respondents. Although we assume that the error term is independently
and identically distributed as in the conditional logit model, the mixed logit model allows
the discrete choice model to apply in the non IIA situation. Estimates in the table
generally show that our previous results obtained with the conditional logit model are
robust. Attributes for self-budget a®ect utility positively, whereas the externalities are
picked up as negatives.
Table 6 also suggests that the means of estimates from the mixed logit model are not
very di®erent from the point estimates from the conditional logit model. While this ¯nd-
ing validates the robustness of previous ¯ndings, the standard deviations estimated may
require some attention. In particular, the standard deviation for the Self Consumption
term looks large compared to the mean and is signi¯cant. The standard deviation for Â is
not signi¯cant whereas that for Ã is found to be signi¯cant at the one percent level. This
outcome could imply that heterogeneity in social preference parameters is an important
issue.
The right panel of Table 6 provides another interesting implication. It shows that the
average estimate of the Other's Income term is negative. The associated standard devia-
tion is large compared to the mean, and more importantly it is signi¯cant. This implies
that there is large heterogeneity in the parameter for preference externality. Looking at
the distribution of the preference parameter, we can estimate that 64.4 percent of our
study sample has negative externality (jealousy) regarding other's income and that the
remaining 35.6 percent have positive preference externality (admiration). This evidence
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serves to support the strategies adopted in theoretical studies on preference externality
such as Liu and Turnovsky [2005] and Nakamoto [2009b] which deal with both jealousy
and admiration. A caveat here is that economists may do better to think about to what
extent jealousy or admiration is pervasive in a macro-economy, rather than to think about
an economy where preference externality is characterized only by a negative or a positive
one. In that sense, the research agenda of Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky [2008] which
considers the heterogeneity of preference parameters is more promising.
The abovementioned ¯ndings suggest that heterogeneity of preference parameter ex-
ists, and ask for further analyses on the determinants of preference structure. In the next
section, we provide the results from the conditional logit model with dummy interactions
in order to investigate if di®erences in individual characteristics lead to di®erences in
parameters of utility function.
4.2 Results from conditional logit model with dummy interac-
tions
In the literature of behavioral economics, it is well-recognized that demographic di®er-
ences lead to substantial di®erences in deep parameters such as the time discount rate
and the rate of risk aversion. Ida and Goto [2009] showed that smokers are endowed
with a higher value of time discounting and a lower value of risk aversion than non-
smokers. Viscusi et al. [2008] showed that eco-conscious individuals have a lower rate
of time discounting than those who are not eco-friendly, but that they exhibit a hyper-
bolic discounting pattern. Small, Winston, and Yan [2005] applied the framework of a
mixed logit model to investigate the distribution of commuters' preferences for speedy
and reliable highway travel, ¯nding that there was substantial heterogeneity in mo-
torists' values of travel time and reliability, suggesting road pricing policies should be
designed to cater to various preferences. Hole [2008] investigated preferences of patients
over general practitioner appointments using standard logit, mixed and latent class logit
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models. He showed that there was signi¯cant preference heterogeneity for all the at-
tributes in the experiment. Using micro-consumption data, Mastrobuoni and Weinberg
[2009] found that those with ¯nancial assets of less than 5,000 US dollars tend to be-
have as hyperbolic consumers, while those with more than that amount can smooth their
intra-monthly pattern of consumption. In addition, from the viewpoint of neuroscience,
Tanaka, Doya, Okada, Ueda, Okamoto, and Yamawaki [2004] and McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, and Cohen
[2004] showed that separate parts of the human brain make short-run and long-run deci-
sions. Thus, if individual characteristics such as gender or age determine which decision
making part of the brain becomes more active, they may explain di®erences in the time
discount rate by those organic variables. In the following analyses, we investigate if dif-
ferences in individual characteristics have consequences on parameter di®erence of social
preference. We consider four acquired individual characteristics as well as two organic
factors as potential sources of parameter heterogeneity.
As a starting point for thinking about heterogeneity issues, it is highly plausible that
di®erence in income level or amount of ¯nancial assets brings about di®erences in ex-
ternality parameters in the utility function. Considering that the rich can make more
of consumption and saving than the poor, this would lead us to expect that the poor
may feel jealousy about other's consumption, and thus exhibit a higher level of neg-
ative consumption/saving externality. On the other hand, taking a di®erent line, the
rich could be considered rich because they have innate characteristics of chasing more
wealth which is derived by negative pecuniary externality. Keynes [1971], Zou [1994] and
Bakshi and Chen [1996] all suggested that rat races to accumulate wealth among the su-
per rich can be explained by the keeping-up-with-the-Joneses e®ect (negative externality
associated with asset). As a benchmark, we consider those individuals in an annual in-
come category higher than 8 as the Income Rich group and those with a ¯nancial asset
category higher than 2 as the Financial Asset Rich group. They account for 14.0 percent
and 34.5 percent of the full sample, respectively.
Another consideration is educational attainment because education itself can work
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as a reputation device and reputation will work as an externality in consumption-saving
decisions. Our conjecture is that individuals with higher academic achievements will be
endowed with a higher reputation in society, which makes them more conspicuous. If it is
true, those with higher educational achievements will have stronger negative externality
in consumption and saving. In this study, those with under-graduate or graduate degrees
are classi¯ed into the High Education group. They account for 41.0 percent of the full
sample.
In addition, we consider that the di®erence in the location of dwelling may cause
heterogeneity in the individuals' preferences. For instance, in Japan, it is said that the
relationship with neighbors is closer in rural areas than in urban areas. Hence, people
in urban areas may be generally less concerned about other's consumption and saving,
and externalities in their utility function may become weaker. We therefore consider a
sub-group of those from Tokyo, Osaka, or Nagoya | the Urban group | which consists
of 26.9 percent of our study sample.
Related to the organic variables are the two variables of age and gender. We consider
them because of ¯ndings in neuroscience. Our hypothesis regarding age is as follows.
Since the average life expectancy of the old is in general shorter than that of the young,
we assume here that, compared to the young, the old use a higher time discount rate, thus
becoming myopic. This may lead to jealousy of other's consumption among older people,
which results in greater consumption negative externality amongst the elderly. Along the
same lines, we assume that the young are more concerned about other's saving because
saving is activity carried out over an uncertain long future. As a benchmark, we use the
Young group consisting of those under the age of 40. They account for 40.6 percent of
our study sample. Finally, regarding gender, we have no conjectures a priori, but Veblen
[1899] provides us with a presumption here. He writes that [f ]rom archaic times down
through all the length of the patriarchal regime it has been the o±ce of the women to
prepare and administer these luxuries, and it has been the perquisite of the men of gentle
birth and breeding to consume them ¢ ¢ ¢ . This invidious traditional distinction has not
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last its force even among the more advanced peoples of today (p.70). Today's society is
much more advanced than in Veblen's time so such a traditional distinction would have
vanished in general, but still, the gender di®erence is an interesting point to be pursued
in investigating heterogeneity of preferences. Data from women account for 44.8 percent
of our study sample.
Focusing on di®erences in these demographic variables, we add interactions with var-
ious dummies into the original four attributes for estimates based on the full sample.
We lost 1,035 observations from the choice experiment because some subjects chose not
to provide information on ¯nancial assets or annual income level, leaving us with 5,847
observations.
Table 7 reports the results with various dummy interactions. From the ¯rst column,
we can see that those with a higher income feel more jealous about consumption than
those with a lower income. Also, the signi¯cance of other's consumption is lost after
including the dummy interactions. It seems that consumption externality was driven by
preference in the high income group. On the other hand, negative externality related to
saving remained unchanged, and the dummy interaction term for other's saving is not
signi¯cant.
Given the stronger negative consumption externality among individuals with a high
income, it is somewhat surprising that the di®erence in the amount of ¯nancial assets
does not lead to parameter heterogeneity, as is shown in the second column of Table 7.
As we will show later, this ¯nding is quite robust against changes in threshold level for
the Asset Rich group. Note also that the robust standard error of the estimate for other's
consumption is large, despite still being signi¯cant at the 10 percent level, after including
the dummy interactions.
Regarding the other two acquired individual characteristics, educational attainment
and place of dwelling, we see that the dummy interaction terms with preference exter-
nalities are not signi¯cant. The estimates for the original four attributes are not very
di®erent from those in the baseline conditional logit model (Table 5). Hence, we see that
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the heterogeneity in educational attainments and housing place do not a®ect preference
parameter heterogeneity.
Much more interesting ¯ndings are shown in the last two columns of Table 7. Although
the e®ects are seen to have marginal signi¯cance, younger people have weaker negative
consumption externality and stronger negative saving externality than the elderly. Put
di®erently, the elderly have stronger negative consumption externality and weaker nega-
tive saving externality. These e®ects may have something to do with life expectancy and
we refer to the literature of evolutionary economics that considers evolution and adaption
of preference structure. Studies in evolutionary economics have recently examined how
people form an optimal shape of happiness over time.21 Our ¯ndings may suggest that
preference structure is actually chosen in an optimal fashion over time: facing a shorter
life expectancy, the elderly shift negative externality in preference from that related to
saving to that associated with consumption. Because saving will play a minor role in lives
of the elderly, this shift of preference structure will mitigate the welfare loss associated
with consumption. Finally, we see that females feel more jealous with respect to both
consumption and saving than males. Well after the time of Veblen, our data collected in
March 2009 shows that the socio-economic situation has changed.
To sum up, we see that income di®erence, age, and gender result in parameter hetero-
geneity associated with social preference. Thus, we can con¯rm that heterogeneity plays
a role in determining the parameters just as previous behavioral economics studies have
found in other ¯elds. In our case, however, these di®erences are picked up weakly, and
therefore we proceed to robustness checks.
In Table 8, we consider all the variables which potentially cause parameter hetero-
geneity in each equation. Dummy interactions are taken for the original four attributes,
but the results are shown only for preference externality terms. Column (1) shows the
baseline case, where threshold levels of ¯nancial assets, annual income, and age are given
21See, for example, Robson [1996], Robson [2001], Rayo and Becker [2007a], Rayo and Becker [2007b],
and Netzer [2009].
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as category 2, category 8, and 40, respectively. From column (1), we see that the e®ects
of Income Rich on other's consumption, of Young on other's saving, and of Female on
other's consumption and saving are found to remain the same as before. On the other
hand, the e®ect of Income Rich on other's saving becomes signi¯cant, and the e®ect of
Young on other's saving loses its signi¯cance. This result is, in general, supportive of
previous ¯ndings. Columns (2) and (3) are threshold changes in the Financial Asset Rich
group in categories 3 and 4, respectively. Columns (4), (5), and (6) are threshold changes
in the Income Rich group in categories 7, 9, and 10, respectively. Finally, in columns (7),
(8), and (9), we changed the threshold age for the Young group to 30, 35, and 45, respec-
tively. Through columns (2) { (9), variables other than the variable for the robustness
checks are kept as the baseline value. The results show that our previous ¯ndings are in
general robust to the threshold levels chosen. We therefore conclude that the individual
characteristics that bring about heterogeneity in social preference parameters are income
level, age, and gender. Asset level, educational attainment, and place of dwelling are not
factors to be pursued.
5 Conclusions
In the literature of behavioral economics, important parameters have been estimated via
experiments, and policy implications derived from theoretical studies that address these
parameters have attained a richness and more practical adaptation. Although the social
preference e®ect is well recognized and although there are a number of happiness studies
that support the view of social preference, direct information on the shape of utility
function with social preference was lacking. In this paper, we have introduced a new
framework to the literature of social preference, allowing us to obtain ¯ndings which are
more directly applicable to theoretical studies of social preference than those reported in
the literature of happiness studies.
Here, we speci¯ed the shape of utility function with social preference with the condi-
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tional logit and mixed logit models. Our major ¯ndings can be summarized as follows.
First, preference externality is characterized by jealousy rather than admiration among
Japanese respondents. Second, the welfare loss in a competitive symmetric equilibrium
caused by the preference externality is around 2.6 percent, compared to the social op-
timum. Third, considering demographic di®erences, heterogeneity in social preference
parameters was shown to be driven by di®erences in income level, age, and gender.
Possible directions of future research include, ¯rst, a consideration of inter-temporal
choice tasks in order to investigate utility functions which depend on a stock variable
of wealth, since in the theoretical literature of social preference, preference externalities
are often considered with wealth externality. Second, using heteroscedastic logit models,
we can investigate di®erences in scale parameters across sub-groups of di®erent individual
characteristics. Since the scale parameters are inversely proportional to the error variances
in logit models, if there are signi¯cant di®erences in them, it implies that di®erent study
groups exhibit di®erent levels of comprehension about choice experiments of the kind
we addressed here. Third, we found from the mixed logit model analysis that around
one third of the respondents are endowed with the social preference of admiration, while
the Japanese socio-economy is, on average, characterized by jealousy. These ¯ndings in
regard to jealousy and admiration should be validated and investigated by macroeconomic
studies on preference externality. A suggestion from these ¯ndings is that researchers
should think about what types of individual characteristics are related to admiration. We
can investigate this point using Bayesian inverse formula following Ida and Goto [2009].
These last two topics are investigated in our accompanying papers.
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6 Appendices
6.1 Appendix 1
In this appendix, following Liu and Turnovsky [2005], we illustrate the e®ects of preference
externalities on individuals' decisions in order to stimulate the reader's intuition. An
individual optimally selects the levels of own consumption and own saving to maximize
the utility (1) given own level of income i. Thus, his budget constraint is given by
i = c + s. Since the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and saving is
given by ¡ds
dc
= Uc
Us
in (1), the maximizing condition is
¡ds
dc
=
Uc
Us
= 1; (8a)
where the relative price between consumption and saving is unity. Looking at Figure 3,
we can con¯rm that at the private maximizing point, the solid curve and the budget con-
straint intersect. It should be remembered that the individual does not take externalities
from other's consumption and saving into consideration when private levels of consump-
tion and saving are chosen. Next, we consider the social planner who chooses socially
optimal allocations of consumption and saving, taking account of the e®ects of preference
externalities. Variables with tilde denote social optimal levels of consumption and saving
chosen by the planner. In this case, the optimal maximizing-condition is given as
¡ds
dc
=
~Uc + ~UC
~Us + ~US
= 1; (8b)
where preference externalities are taken into account. For simplicity, here we assume that
the form of utility functions is homothetic, thereby obtaining ~UC = Â ~Uc and US = ÃUs,
where Â and Ã are parameters of what. The negative sign of Â (Ã) indicates jealousy
externality about reference consumption (saving). If they are positive, admiration is
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observed. Then, Equation (8b) can be rewritten as
¡ds
dc
=
(1 + Â)Uc
(1 + Ã)Us
= 1: (8c)
To focus on the impacts of consumption externalities on the individual's decision, we
assume that there does not exist the saving externality Ã = 0. In this case, from (8c), we
can obtain (1+Â)Uc = Us. Suppose that subjects feel jealous about reference consumption
(i.e., Â < 0). In this case, Uc > Us. Figure 3 depicts this case, showing that the level
of consumption privately chosen is greater than the socially optimal level. Conversely,
when individuals feel admiration, the relationship is reversed. It is easy to see that we
can apply the same logic to the e®ect of saving externalities.
From our estimates of the parameters given in Table 5, we can see how much the
externalities in utility function reduce welfare in the competitive equilibrium, compared
to the social optimum. From Equation 6 and the budget constraint i = c + s, we obtain
the private optimal allocations as c = 0:157i and s = 0:843i. Assuming a symmetric
equilibrium, i = I and c = C, the social optimum then can be obtained as Copt = 0:145i
and Sopt = 0:885i. Hence, assuming away constant terms in the utility function, we see
that the welfare level obtained by the private allocation is reduced by 2.615 percent from
the socially optimal level.
6.2 Appendix 2
Here we provide some results of the rationality tests. First, one of our questions asked
about the reference group that the subjects de¯ne. Among 1,043 total respondents, 43
speci¯ed that they do not have reference group and do not compare themselves with
others. With this information, we divide our entire sample into two groups; those with a
reference group and those without a reference group. We divide the entire sample here
because the sample with no reference group could a®ect the structure of the equation
more generally (Viscusi et al. [2008]).
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In the experiment, if the subjects understand the socio-economic choice tasks correctly,
we will obtain externalities in the estimated utility function for the sub-groups with
reference group, while » and Ã will not be signi¯cantly di®erent from zero for those
without reference groups. The number of samples for the ¯rst sub-group is still as many
as 6,624 while that for the second sub-group is reduced to 224. Table 9 shows the results.
From the left panel, we see that the results obtained above remain unchanged for the
sub-group of those with a reference group. However, the right panel shows an intriguing
pattern for those without a reference group: as for the coe±cients of self budget, self
saving is estimated correctly and is signi¯cant. On the other hand, other's consumption
and saving are estimated to be quite close to zero and do not reach signi¯cance. Because
of the small number of observations, we do not know how much we can attribute the
¯nding to the rationality of subjects. But still, this ¯nding will at least provide some,
albeit weak, evidence that our choice experiments are valid.
Our second rationality test is related to jealousy. We consider two sub-groups, one
with higher jealousy (with jealousy >= 4) and the other with lower jealousy (with jealousy
<= 3). Because the self-reported intensity of jealousy is a demographic variable, we add
interactions of a higher-jealousy dummy, taking value one if jealous >= 4 otherwise zero,
to the original four attributes for estimates based on the entire sample. Table 10 shows
the result. As is clearly shown from the second column, the negative externality e®ect of
other's saving gets stronger for the sub-sample with higher jealousy, as is expected. While
the externality in other's consumption is indi®erent between those with or without higher-
jealousy, we would attribute this outcome to a general inclination to saving behavior
among our subjects.
Following Heberlein, Wilson, Bishop, and Schae®er [2005], Table 11 shows the result
of the scope tests. With respect to Self Saving, estimates indicate that larger saving is
related to higher utility. Estimates for dummies related to Self Consumption are not
signi¯cant and this outcome seems to imply \moral purchase property" regarding Self
Consumption (Kahneman and Knetsch [1992]). Nevertheless, we attribute this rather
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disappointing result to the general inclination of subjects to saving. The estimate for
Other's Consumption 4 is as expected, while the e®ects of Other's Consumption 2 and
Other's Consumption 3 are not signi¯cant. However, the sign is in the right direction.
Finally, the estimates of Other's Saving 3 and Other's Saving 4 seem to be acceptable but
the magnitudes of the point estimates are reversed. Note that there is overlap for those
estimates in the 95 percent con¯dence intervals (not shown). The evidence presented
above in general supports the validity of our choice experiment.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Whole sample Male Female
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Variable
Female [0,1] 0.48 0.50
Age in years 44.86 14.62 44.69 14.33 45.04 14.95
Middle School [0,1] 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.17
High School [0,1] 0.33 0.47 0.30 0.46 0.36 0.48
College/ Post Grad [0,1] 0.39 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.27 0.45
Married [0,1] 0.65 0.48 0.65 0.48 0.66 0.48
N 1043 547 496
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Table 3: Happiness Regressions (PART 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep var. Happiness Happiness Happiness Happiness Happiness Happiness
log income 0.02*** 0.01 0.02*** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
log reference income -0.02 -0.03* -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Jealousy -0.13*** -0.09** -0.09**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
log ¯nancial asset 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.34***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 866 866 866 866 866 866
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Mixed Logit Estimates of Situation Choice
Variable Mixed Logit Coe±cient Variable Mixed Logit Coe±cient
(Standard Deviation) (Standard Deviation)
Self Comsuption 0.4136*** (3.0186)*** Self Income 1.7890*** (0.0165)
Self Saving 4.2566*** (2.9469)*** Other's Income -0.4515*** (1.2240)***
Other's Consumption -0.3492*** (0.2503)
Other's Saving -0.8497*** (0.8140)***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
42
T
ab
le
7:
C
on
d
it
io
n
al
L
og
it
E
st
im
at
es
w
it
h
V
ar
io
u
s
D
u
m
m
y
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
s
T
yp
e
of
du
m
m
y
In
co
m
e
R
ic
h
(>
=
8)
A
ss
et
R
ic
h
(>
=
2)
H
ig
h
E
du
ca
ti
on
U
rb
an
Y
ou
ng
(<
40
)
Fe
m
al
e
V
ar
ia
bl
e
C
on
di
ti
on
al
L
og
it
C
oe
±
ci
en
t
(R
ob
us
t
St
an
da
rd
E
rr
or
)
Se
lf
C
om
su
pt
io
n
0.
42
05
**
*
0.
55
07
**
*
0.
39
72
**
*
0.
48
09
**
*
0.
41
77
**
*
0.
59
60
**
*
(0
.1
16
)
(0
.1
33
)
(0
.1
40
)
(0
.1
24
)
(0
.1
37
)
(0
.1
41
)
Se
lf
Sa
vi
ng
2.
04
61
**
*
2.
14
89
**
*
2.
09
29
**
*
1.
97
23
**
*
2.
01
66
**
*
1.
89
80
**
*
(0
.1
24
)
(0
.1
42
)
(0
.1
52
)
(0
.1
32
)
(0
.1
46
)
(0
.1
48
)
O
th
er
's
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
-0
.0
36
99
-0
.0
97
29
*
-0
.1
52
1*
**
-0
.0
71
73
-0
.1
64
2*
**
-0
.0
42
00
(0
.0
46
1)
(0
.0
53
6)
(0
.0
57
0)
(0
.0
50
0)
(0
.0
56
0)
(0
.0
56
1)
O
th
er
's
Sa
vi
ng
-0
.4
44
4*
**
-0
.4
49
7*
**
-0
.4
47
7*
**
-0
.4
69
8*
**
-0
.4
08
3*
**
-0
.4
04
7*
**
(0
.0
46
5)
(0
.0
53
6)
(0
.0
56
7)
(0
.0
50
3)
(0
.0
55
6)
(0
.0
56
8)
D
ym
m
y
In
te
ra
ct
io
ns
Se
lf
C
om
su
pt
io
n
0.
26
98
-0
.3
06
6
0.
12
94
-0
.1
14
2
0.
08
20
9
-0
.3
16
5
*
D
um
m
y
(0
.3
08
)
(0
.2
24
)
(0
.2
17
)
(0
.2
46
)
(0
.2
20
)
(0
.2
18
)
Se
lf
Sa
vi
ng
0.
34
50
-0
.2
01
9
-0
.0
17
27
0.
48
33
*
0.
16
93
0.
52
74
**
*
D
um
m
y
(0
.3
40
)
(0
.2
42
)
(0
.2
33
)
(0
.2
69
)
(0
.2
37
)
(0
.2
37
)
O
th
er
's
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
-0
.5
10
7*
**
-0
.0
13
84
0.
12
13
-0
.1
31
1
0.
16
37
*
-0
.1
58
4*
*
D
um
m
y
(0
.1
38
)
(0
.0
91
1)
(0
.0
87
7)
(0
.1
00
)
(0
.0
88
3)
(0
.0
89
1)
O
th
er
's
Sa
vi
ng
-0
.1
90
0
-0
.0
48
00
-0
.0
50
72
-0
.0
03
00
5
-0
.1
56
8*
-0
.1
66
5*
*
D
um
m
y
(0
.1
32
)
(0
.0
91
6)
(0
.0
88
2)
(0
.1
00
)
(0
.0
89
2)
(0
.0
88
9)
**
*
p<
0.
01
,
**
p<
0.
05
,
*
p<
0.
1
43
T
ab
le
8:
C
on
d
it
io
n
al
L
og
it
E
st
im
at
es
w
it
h
V
ar
io
u
s
D
u
m
m
y
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
s
(R
ob
u
st
n
es
s
C
h
ec
k
)
R
ob
us
tn
es
s
C
he
ck
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
V
ar
ia
bl
e
C
on
di
ti
on
al
L
og
it
C
oe
±
ci
en
t
(R
ob
us
t
St
an
da
rd
E
rr
or
)
Se
lf
C
om
su
pt
io
n
0.
73
20
**
*
0.
72
52
**
*
0.
58
74
**
0.
77
45
**
*
0.
69
55
**
*
0.
69
05
**
*
0.
63
46
**
*
0.
64
05
**
*
0.
79
34
**
*
(0
.2
42
)
(0
.2
34
)
(0
.2
29
)
(0
.2
51
)
(0
.2
38
)
(0
.2
35
)
(0
.2
20
)
(0
.2
28
)
(0
.2
53
)
Se
lf
Sa
vi
ng
1.
68
09
**
*
1.
68
22
**
*
1.
61
77
**
*
1.
80
34
**
*
1.
65
26
**
*
1.
68
84
**
*
1.
73
34
**
*
1.
65
81
**
*
1.
75
53
**
*
(0
.2
56
)
(0
.2
47
)
(0
.2
42
)
(0
.2
66
)
(0
.2
49
)
(0
.2
47
)
(0
.2
33
)
(0
.2
42
)
(0
.2
67
)
O
th
er
's
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
-0
.0
22
87
-0
.0
45
94
-0
.0
31
77
-0
.0
31
25
-0
.0
78
10
-0
.1
12
1
-0
.0
23
92
-0
.0
18
27
-0
.0
48
11
(0
.0
97
8)
(0
.0
94
3)
(0
.0
92
1)
(0
.1
01
)
(0
.0
96
1)
(0
.0
95
3)
(0
.0
89
0)
(0
.0
91
7)
(0
.1
04
)
O
th
er
's
Sa
vi
ng
-0
.1
96
6*
*
-0
.2
67
8*
**
-0
.2
61
2*
**
-0
.1
93
3*
-0
.2
15
9*
*
-0
.2
23
3*
*
-0
.2
85
5*
**
-0
.2
45
6*
**
-0
.1
76
4*
(0
.0
97
7)
(0
.0
93
8)
(0
.0
91
9)
(0
.1
01
)
(0
.0
96
4)
(0
.0
95
5)
(0
.0
90
1)
(0
.0
92
1)
(0
.1
04
)
D
um
m
y
In
te
ra
ct
io
ns
O
th
er
's
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
-0
.6
36
5*
**
-0
.6
61
1*
**
-0
.6
56
4*
**
-0
.3
36
1*
**
-0
.5
17
8*
**
-0
.3
14
3
-0
.6
12
0*
**
-0
.6
19
9*
**
-0
.6
27
2*
**
*
In
co
m
e
R
ic
h
(0
.1
50
)
(0
.1
50
)
(0
.1
50
)
(0
.1
14
)
(0
.1
74
)
(0
.2
02
)
(0
.1
50
)
(0
.1
50
)
(0
.1
49
)
O
th
er
's
Sa
vi
ng
-0
.2
92
1*
*
-0
.3
37
1*
*
-0
.3
27
5*
*
-0
.1
71
9
-0
.3
46
8*
*
-0
.3
78
5*
*
-0
.2
67
0*
-0
.2
98
2*
*
-0
.2
90
5*
*
*
In
co
m
e
R
ic
h
(0
.1
45
)
(0
.1
45
)
(0
.1
45
)
(0
.1
14
)
(0
.1
69
)
(0
.1
93
)
(0
.1
45
)
(0
.1
46
)
(0
.1
45
)
O
th
er
's
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
0.
08
83
0
0.
24
88
**
0.
29
15
*
0.
07
94
5
0.
07
91
2
0.
04
87
1
0.
09
47
6
0.
08
73
8
0.
10
14
*
F
in
an
ci
al
A
ss
et
R
ic
h
(0
.1
02
)
(0
.1
18
)
(0
.1
54
)
(0
.1
03
)
(0
.1
01
)
(0
.1
01
)
(0
.1
00
)
(0
.1
01
)
(0
.1
04
)
O
th
er
's
Sa
vi
ng
-0
.1
26
1
0.
09
57
0
0.
10
73
-0
.1
21
6
-0
.1
09
2
-0
.1
06
2
-0
.0
63
37
-0
.0
98
29
-0
.1
30
7
*
F
in
an
ci
al
A
ss
et
R
ic
h
(0
.1
03
)
(0
.1
19
)
(0
.1
52
)
(0
.1
03
)
(0
.1
03
)
(0
.1
02
)
(0
.1
01
)
(0
.1
02
)
(0
.1
05
)
O
th
er
's
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
0.
10
28
0.
08
03
9
0.
09
80
1
0.
11
25
0.
09
43
0
0.
08
73
3
0.
09
18
3
0.
08
99
6
0.
11
70
*
H
ig
h
E
du
ca
ti
on
(0
.0
94
4)
(0
.0
94
9)
(0
.0
93
8)
(0
.0
94
1)
(0
.0
94
0)
(0
.0
94
1)
(0
.0
95
5)
(0
.0
95
8)
(0
.0
93
7)
O
th
er
's
Sa
vi
ng
-0
.0
47
42
-0
.0
76
03
-0
.0
70
49
-0
.0
36
82
-0
.0
44
33
-0
.0
49
09
-0
.0
66
95
-0
.0
33
81
-0
.0
66
41
*
H
ig
h
E
du
ca
ti
on
(0
.0
94
4)
(0
.0
94
6)
(0
.0
93
6)
(0
.0
94
3)
(0
.0
94
1)
(0
.0
94
1)
(0
.0
95
3)
(0
.0
96
3)
(0
.0
93
3)
O
th
er
's
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
0.
11
22
0.
14
30
0.
12
73
0.
13
93
0.
12
83
0.
14
99
0.
20
76
*
0.
14
59
0.
12
33
*
Y
ou
ng
(0
.0
95
8)
(0
.0
96
1)
(0
.0
93
7)
(0
.0
95
4)
(0
.0
95
8)
(0
.0
95
8)
(0
.1
17
)
(0
.1
04
)
(0
.0
95
4)
O
th
er
's
Sa
vi
ng
-0
.2
36
4*
*
-0
.1
69
9*
-0
.1
77
6*
-0
.2
26
4*
*
-0
.2
33
7*
*
-0
.2
29
8*
*
-0
.0
94
86
-0
.2
12
5*
*
-0
.2
23
1*
*
*
Y
ou
ng
(0
.0
97
4)
(0
.0
96
7)
(0
.0
94
2)
(0
.0
97
1)
(0
.0
97
4)
(0
.0
97
3)
(0
.1
20
)
(0
.1
07
)
(0
.0
96
6)
O
th
er
's
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
-0
.2
36
9*
*
-0
.2
31
9*
*
-0
.2
24
3*
*
-0
.2
25
1*
*
-0
.1
82
5*
-0
.1
47
0
-0
.2
35
8*
*
-0
.2
36
2*
*
-0
.2
35
7*
*
*
Fe
m
al
e
(0
.0
97
4)
(0
.0
97
5)
(0
.0
97
6)
(0
.0
99
4)
(0
.0
96
1)
(0
.0
95
4)
(0
.0
97
1)
(0
.0
97
3)
(0
.0
97
2)
O
th
er
's
Sa
vi
ng
-0
.2
49
4*
*
-0
.2
43
7*
*
-0
.2
41
8*
*
-0
.2
53
2*
*
-0
.2
36
9*
*
-0
.2
32
7*
*
-0
.2
42
2*
*
-0
.2
42
9*
*
-0
.2
45
0*
*
*
Fe
m
al
e
(0
.0
96
8)
(0
.0
96
9)
(0
.0
96
9)
(0
.0
99
0)
(0
.0
95
7)
(0
.0
94
7)
(0
.0
96
9)
(0
.0
97
0)
(0
.0
96
7)
O
th
er
's
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
-0
.0
86
08
-0
.0
94
11
-0
.0
91
45
-0
.1
09
1
-0
.1
10
2
-0
.1
17
4
-0
.0
84
09
-0
.0
90
44
-0
.0
89
55
*
U
rb
an
(0
.1
03
)
(0
.1
02
)
(0
.1
03
)
(0
.1
03
)
(0
.1
02
)
(0
.1
03
)
(0
.1
02
)
(0
.1
03
)
(0
.1
03
)
O
th
er
's
Sa
vi
ng
0.
03
99
0
0.
02
61
2
0.
03
03
2
0.
02
93
3
0.
03
34
3
0.
03
67
1
0.
02
29
3
0.
03
92
2
0.
04
03
6
*
U
rb
an
(0
.1
02
)
(0
.1
02
)
(0
.1
02
)
(0
.1
02
)
(0
.1
02
)
(0
.1
02
)
(0
.1
02
)
(0
.1
02
)
(0
.1
02
)
D
ym
m
y
in
te
ra
ct
io
ns
w
it
h
Se
lf
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
an
d
Se
lf
Sa
vi
ng
in
cl
ud
ed
.
**
*
p<
0.
01
,
**
p<
0.
05
,
*
p<
0.
1
44
Table 9: Conditional Logit Estimates of Situation Choice: Subsample Analysis
Sub-group Subjects with Reference Group Subjects w/o Reference Group
Variable Conditional Logit Coe±cient Conditional Logit Coe±cient
(Robust Standard Error) (Robust Standard Error)
Self Comsuption 0.3858*** (0.1003 ) 0.2316 (0.5599)
Self Saving 2.0307*** (0.1074) 1.925*** (0.6387)
Other's Consumption -0.1133*** (0.0404) 0.0478 (0.2237)
Other's Saving -0.4530*** (0.0405) -0.0205 (0.2088)
N 6648 224
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 10: Conditional Logit Estimates with Higher-Jealousy Dummy Interactions
Type of dummy Baseline Jealous
Variable Conditional Logit Coe±cient Conditional Logit Coe±cient
(Robust Standard Error) (Robust Standard Error)
Self Comsuption 0.3766*** (0.0987) 0.4133*** (0.1154)
Self Saving 2.0226*** (0.1059) 2.0630*** (0.1230)
Other's Consumption -0.1099*** (0.0397) -0.0870* (0.0462)
Other's Saving -0.4376*** (0.0397) -0.3775*** (0.0462)
Dummy interaction (SC) -0.1286 (0.2241)
Dummy interaction (SS) -0.1374 (0.2431)
Dummy interaction (RC) -0.0867 (0.0913)
Dummy interaction (RS) -0.2262** (0.0908)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 11: Conditional Logit Estimates, Scope Test
Variable Conditional Logit Coe±cient
(Robust Standard Error)
Self Comsuption 0.3766*** (0.0987)
Self Comsuption 2 -0.1033 (0.2426)
Self Comsuption 3 0.0187 (0.4060)
Self Comsuption 4 -0.1174 (0.5224)
Self Saving 2.0226*** (0.1059)
Self Saving 0.7756*** (0.2361)
Self Saving 1.3112*** (0.4579)
Self Saving 2.3669*** (0.4590)
Other's Consumption -0.1099*** (0.0397)
Other's Consumption 2 -0.1319 (0.1720)
Other's Consumption 3 -0.0638 (0.1544)
Other's Consumption 4 -0.2855*** (0.0887)
Other's Saving -0.4376*** (0.0397)
Other's Saving 2 -0.0415 (0.1513)
Other's Saving 3 -0.4207*** (0.0973)
Other's Saving 4 -0.2883** (0.1332)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
45
